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Abstract: The recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver 
consumer financial services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer 
financial markets. In response, the Obama administration proposed a new agency to oversee 
consumer financial services, and the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act embraced the Administration’s proposal by creating the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection. Other regulatory reforms have been advanced, and in some 
cases adopted, in recent years, at both the federal and state level. In this paper, we provide an 
overview of consumer financial markets, detailing the purposes they serve, the extent to which 
they suffer from market failures or other deficiencies, and the structure of our current system of 
regulation. To illustrate our analytical framework, we present case studies on retirement 
savings, residential mortgages, payday lending, and mutual funds.  We conclude with a series of 
observations on the limits of government intervention, suggestions about how to measure 
whether government intervention is successful, and potentially fruitful lines of future research 
and data collection.  
 
 
 
   2
The authors have benefitted from helpful comments from David Autor, Sendhil Mullainathan, Tim Taylor, and 
participants in the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Study’s  February 2010 Symposium: Moving Forward – The 
Future of Consumer Credit and Mortgage Finance.     3
I. Introduction 
 
Recent economic events have focused attention on the financial decisions made by 
consumers and the practices of retail financial institutions.   Many argue that consumer confusion 
in the increasingly complex mortgage market contributed to the subprime market meltdown of 
2007, which in turn triggered the global financial crisis.  More generally, there is widespread 
concern that consumers are being asked to take increasing responsibility for their own financial 
wellbeing in retirement, and that many households are ill prepared for this task.    
 
  While consumer financial regulation has always been an important element of public 
policy, it has received much greater emphasis recently. One of the first actions of the 111
th 
Congress under the new Obama Administration was the passage of the Credit Card 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, which banned retroactive 
fee changes and required consumers to opt-in to over-the-limit fees, among other features.
1  A far 
more comprehensive approach to the protection of consumers was embodied in the Obama 
Administration’s proposals to create a new regulatory body to oversee consumer financial 
services. This proposal was a centerpiece of the Treasury Department’s Financial Regulatory 
Reform plan and is included in both House and Senate financial reform bills.  The objective of 
this reform is spelled out in the original Treasury white paper on the topic: 
 
 “To rebuild trust in our markets, we need strong and consistent regulation and 
supervision of consumer financial services and investment markets. We should base this 
oversight not on speculation or abstract models, but on actual data about how people 
make financial decisions. We must promote transparency, simplicity, fairness, 
accountability, and access. We propose: 
• A new Consumer Financial Protection Agency to protect consumers across the financial 
sector from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. 
• Stronger regulations to improve the transparency, fairness, and appropriateness of 
consumer and investor products and services. 
• A level playing field and higher standards for providers of consumer financial products 
and services, whether or not they are part of a bank.”
2 
 
The Administration’s proposal was incorporated into title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which establishes a new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection. The Bureau is designed to serve as the primary federal agency responsible for 
consumer financial protection for credit, savings and payment services. A wide range of other 
federal agencies and state authorities with retain important supervising roles with respect to other 
areas of consumer finance.     
 
                                                 
1 For details, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reforms-to-Protect-American-Credit-
Card-Holders/ (visited 4/25/10). 
2 See http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (visited 4/25/2010).   4
  Our goal in this paper is to explain the economic basis for consumer financial regulation.  
We begin by briefly describing the functions, scope and scale of consumer financial markets. We 
then survey the justifications for government intervention into consumer financial markets. 
While regulation in this field is often framed in terms “transparency, simplicity, fairness, 
accountability, and access,” we relate these concepts to various market failures that may impede 
economic efficiency or create unacceptable distributional outcomes. We then review the 
structure of consumer financial regulation in the United States and  the most common regulatory 
mechanisms that are used to police consumer financial markets.  
 
To illustrate how many of the themes in the paper apply to consumer financial markets, 
we present case studies on retirement savings, residential mortgages, mutual funds, and payday 
lending.  Finally, we outline the types of future research (and their data requirements) that would 
be most useful in informing how to optimally regulate consumer financial markets. By making 
clear the economic foundations of consumer financial regulation, we hope to better define the 
metrics for evaluating the success or failure of regulatory reform.  In short, without knowing the 
goals for reform, it is impossible to assess whether we have succeeded in creating a “better” 
financial system. 
  
II. A Brief Overview of Consumer Financial Markets 
 
A. Functions of the consumer financial system 
 
While consumer finance could be defined by reference to specific institutions (banks or 
insurance companies) or products (deposits or life insurance), we follow Merton and Bodie 
(1995) and Tufano (2009) in positing that financial systems can be best understood in terms of 
the functions they perform. These functions include
3 : 
 
•  Payments. The financial system must provide a mechanism for the transfer of money and 
payments for goods and services. In the consumer sector, the payments function includes 
cash, checks, debit cards, credit cards, pre-paid cards, postal and private money orders, 
wire transfers, remittances, barter, online funds transfer tools like PayPal, Automated 
Clearing House (ACH) transactions, payroll systems, and the infrastructure which 
supports all of these activities. These products are delivered by many different 
organizations, including the government (e.g., money and post offices), banking 
institutions, non-banks (e.g., check cashing stores), data processors, online businesses, 
and others.   
•  Managing risk.  There are many mechanisms to mitigate the financial risks faced by 
consumers, such as insurance (health, life, property and casualty, disability), financial 
products (e.g., put options to protect against portfolio declines), precautionary savings, 
social networks, and government welfare programs. The organizations that perform this 
function range from the family and local community to insurance companies and 
government disaster relief plans.  From the perspective of businesses which serve 
                                                 
3 In prior work, advice and resolution of conflicts of interest have also been included as financial functions.  In this 
paper, we characterize these activities as solutions to problems of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts.     5
consumers, risks are managed through credit scoring models and credit risk practices, as 
well as by assembling a diversified portfolio or securing insurance against default.   
•  Borrowing—advancing funds from the future to today.  The function of household credit 
encompasses short-term unsecured borrowing (e.g., credit and charge cards, banking 
overdraft protection, and payday loans), longer-term unsecured borrowing (e.g., student 
loans, person to person lending), and secured borrowing (e.g., auto loans, mortgage loans, 
and margin loans). The provision of credit takes place in the formal sector, the informal 
sector (friends and family), and through various hybrid organizations (e.g., person to 
person lending websites). In addition to explicit borrowing, implicit borrowing is built 
into various derivative products, including options and forwards, as well as commercial 
structures (e.g., rent-to-own schemes).  
•  Saving/Investing—advancing funds from today until a later date.  Investing or savings 
functions are embodied in a host of products and services, including bank products 
(savings accounts and CDs), mutual funds, variable annuities, workplace retirement 
programs, and Social Security.  These products vary based on the intended time horizon, 
level and type of risk borne by the investor, tax treatment, and other factors.  
B.  The economics of consumer financial businesses 
 
To understand the regulation of consumer financial markets, it is useful to get some idea 
of the economics of this sector, which is at the same time both very large and quite small.  In 
aggregate, households held $68.2 trillion in assets at year-end 2009 with 33.8% ($23.1 trillion) of 
these funds in tangible assets (mostly real estate) and $45.1 trillion in financial assets.
4 On the 
other side of the balance sheet, households held $14.0 trillion in liabilities, mostly home 
mortgages ($10.3 trillion) and consumer credit ($2.5 trillion, primarily in credit cards). In sheer 
size, the household sector dominates the corporate sector. Total corporate debt, for example, is 
only about half the size of household debt ($7.2 trillion). 
 
Balance sheet numbers alone belie the full magnitude of the consumer finance sector. 
Visa and MasterCard, for instance, report combined annual transaction volume exceeding $6 
trillion.
5 While easy to focus on such aggregates, this sum is comprised of a staggering number 
of small transactions: over 70 billion a year.  Similarly, while total mutual fund industry assets 
exceed $10 trillion, the ICI reports that the median investor has $100,000 in fund assets spread 
across four different accounts.
6 Even with these comparatively large accounts (nearly twice 
                                                 
4 See Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1: Flow of Funds Account of the United States (Mar. 11, 2010) 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf, visited 5/4/2010),  This information refers to households 
and non-profit organizations, as the two are considered a single sector in the Flow of Fund calculations. As 
nonprofits account for only five to seven percent of assets and liabilities, these figures are largely reflective of the 
household sector (Teplin, 2001). 
5 See http://www.corporate.visa.com/av/pdf/Visa_Inc_Overview.pdf  (visited 5/4/2010, data as of March 2008) and 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/newsroom/annual_report/MasterCard_2007AR.pdf (visited 5/4/2010, 
data as of December 2007). Figures represent all card transactions worldwide.   
6 See http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_profile09.pdf (visited 5/4/2010).   6
median family income in America), the fund industry has to deal with a large number of small 
accounts.   
 
Tables 1 and 2 give a finer breakdown of the asset holdings and liabilities of U.S. 
families in 2007 by type of asset or liability, for all families and by position in the income 
distribution. These tables highlight various features of consumer financial markets. First, as 
noted above, the median account balances for many of the cells in the bottom panels of Table 1 
and 2 are indeed relatively small. Second, although transaction accounts are the most widely held 
asset (92%), one-quarter of families in the bottom decile of the income distribution do not have 
such accounts. These families, the so-called unbanked, rely on other mechanisms for payment 
services.
7 Third, asset and liability holdings vary considerably by position in the income 
distribution, particularly for direct holdings of equities and retirement savings accounts and for 
mortgage debt. This disparate incidence strikes some as problematic and has led some 
policymakers to call for expanded access to some types of financial services. 
 
The small account and transaction sizes have several implications for retail financial 
services and their regulation. First, the cost of customer acquisition or asset gathering is large 
relative to the cost of producing actual services. Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) find 
that distribution costs account for 39% of all charges paid by mutual fund investors. Second, 
because of the sheer number of transactions, the level of contact with and information about 
customers may be limited. This makes full-information contracting nearly impossible and gives 
rise to low-cost automated solutions like credit scoring models. Third, economies of scale and 
scope are often more complex than in simple micro-economics models. For example, the 
marginal cost of a single additional account might be nearly zero, but adding many accounts 
might necessitate more call center operators, or even a new call center, with lumpy additions to 
cost. Finally, because of the joint nature of production, establishing product or activity costs can 
be challenging.  All of these considerations should factor into assessing the costs and benefits of 
financial regulation. 
 
III.  The Need for Consumer Financial Regulation 
 
Consumer advocates often make the case for consumer financial regulation on   
distributional grounds, arguing that unregulated markets disadvantage lower income households. 
This is an important consideration, but we begin by first assessing the potential inefficiencies of 
consumer financial markets that might call for regulation before turning to distributional 
considerations. 
 
There are several features of consumer financial markets that can lead to inefficient 
outcomes that may justify government intervention. Most fundamentally, financial markets often 
involve both time and uncertainty. Many financial transactions require initial payments from one 
party to another, offset by payments in the opposite direction in the future that are explicitly 
state-contingent or implicitly subject to the risk of complete or partial default. During the life of 
                                                 
7 Another substantial group of households (17%) maintain transaction accounts but are considered under-banked 
because they also rely on alternative financial services, such as payday lenders and pawn shops (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 2009).   7
a financial transaction, the two parties involved have conflicting interests and often have 
asymmetric information, leading to a rich variety of problems that have been studied by contract 
and information theorists. It is difficult to structure contracts that handle every possible 
contingency that may arise during the life of a transaction, and this contractual incompleteness 
can create problems. 
 
  Another set of problems arise because consumers may not behave as time-consistent, 
rational utility maximizers. They may, for example, have present-biased preferences, in which 
decisions each period favor present consumption even though the consumer would display 
greater patience if enabled to commit to a future consumption plan.  Just as importantly, 
consumers may lack the cognitive capacity to optimize their financial situation, even if presented 
with all the information that in principle is required to do so. It is unusually difficult to learn how 
to optimize in certain financial markets. Many financial transactions are infrequently undertaken 
and have delayed outcomes that are subject to large random shocks, so personal experience is 
slow to accumulate and is contaminated by noise. Social learning is encumbered first by the fact 
that many financial shocks are common, so that averaging outcomes across neighbors may not 
eliminate noise, and second by the rapid pace of financial innovation, which reduces the 
relevance of older cohorts’ experiences. A strong social taboo on discussing personal financial 
matters in certain cultures further reduces the effectiveness of social learning (Zelizer, 1994). 
 
  In order to understand the many sources of inefficiency in consumer financial markets, it 
is helpful to start with the traditional taxonomy of conditions that may result in market failure 
even with fully rational consumers.
8 We then relate these to the failures that may be caused by 
present-biased preferences or cognitive limitations.  Finally, we consider distributional issues.   
 
A.  Traditional Economic Justifications for Consumer Financial Regulation 
 
Enforcement of financial contracts. Many consumer financial transactions span long time 
horizons or entail the transfer of wealth over considerable geographic distance.  The temporal 
aspect of financial products gives firms the ability to engage in moral hazard in a way that may 
impede market efficiency. In markets such as those for retirement savings or life insurance, 
performance occurs over a long period of time, well after consumers and firms enter into a 
contractual commitment. Consumers are unlikely to be able to engage in continuous monitoring, 
and reputation may be insufficient to discipline firms who are tempted to expropriate their 
clients’ wealth. In this case, mandatory capital requirements and other forms of on-going 
supervision may be needed to ensure the development of well-functioning markets. Such 
regulation is valuable not only for consumers, but also for firms, as it provides a commitment 
device that enables them to win business that would otherwise be unavailable. 
  
Externalities. Individual financial behavior may affect others in ways that are not 
reflected in market prices. Positive externalities from human capital accumulation and home 
                                                 
8 Earlier papers have presented more limited taxonomies of the economic justifications for consumer financial 
regulation. Hynes and Posner (2002) offer an overview of potential market failures in consumer credit transactions. 
Carlin and Gervais (2009) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) present models dealing with financial advice.  Bar-Gill 
(2008) and Wright (2007) provide differing perspectives on the behavioral economics of consumer contracts.   8
ownership have been used to justify government subsidies to student loans and home mortgages.  
Conversely, foreclosures have social costs that are not taken into account by mortgage borrowers 
and lenders.
9 More generally, correlated investment strategies may increase the systemic risk in 
financial markets and thus warrant supervisory intervention. 
 
Search costs and market power. Price dispersion is a feature of many retail markets. It 
can be sustained by the existence of search costs which make some consumers willing to pay 
higher prices than they might find elsewhere. These search costs give retailers a degree of market 
power, allowing them to charge prices above marginal cost. One example in the financial arena 
is S&P 500 index funds—providers charge a wide range of fees for an essentially identical 
product (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004). Search costs can be addressed by providing information 
on market prices (e.g., Medicare Part D prescription drug plan decision aids), by standardizing 
information provision (e.g., requiring firms to quote interest rates as an annualized percentage 
rate, or mandating uniform disclosure of fees and past returns in mutual fund prospectuses), or 
through direct regulation of prices. More general responses to market power include limitations 
on the scale or scope of financial service firms or enhanced anti-trust requirements. 
 
Information as a public good. To make informed decisions, consumers often need 
information about financial products that they cannot efficiently generate themselves and for 
which joint production with other consumers is not easily coordinated. Often the financial 
provider will be the most efficient supplier of this information. Disclosure requirements—
mandates that the firm produce and disseminate certain types of information—are an example of 
interventions that address this type of market failure.  Anti-fraud rules backed through judicial 
enforcement mechanisms serve a similar purpose, though traditionally were limited to intentional 
affirmative misrepresentations. 
  
Other information failures. Consumer financial markets can also fail because of 
information asymmetries. Indeed, consumer finance provides the textbook cases of information 
problems: the underprovision of insurance and consumer credit as a result of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. The regulatory responses to this type of market failure include mandating the 
purchase of insurance (e.g., auto insurance), public provision of universal insurance programs 
such as social security to mitigate adverse selection, and subsidizing private insurance purchases 
through the tax system. 
 
  In some cases, the government “solution” to ill-functioning private insurance markets 
may itself create moral hazard that might justify further intervention. For example, the social 
safety net might encourage individuals to assume excessive financial risks which will result in 
some suffering large financial losses that qualify them for public aid. Government can mitigate 
this moral hazard through restrictions on financial risk-taking, such as limits on employer stock 
holdings in retirement accounts.  
 
Finally, the complexity of many consumer financial products generate both information 
                                                 
9 Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2009) present evidence that foreclosures lower the prices of nearby houses. The 
effect is extremely local and is stronger in low-priced neighborhoods, suggesting that the transmission mechanism 
may be vandalism or neighborhood deterioration.   9
asymmetries (firms know more about the products than do consumers) and transaction costs that 
make it difficult for even the most sophisticated individuals to comparison shop. This complexity 
may suppress the development of robust markets for certain consumer financial products. In 
these circumstances, constraints on the variation in product terms may actually improve social 
welfare, albeit at the cost of inhibiting consumer choice. 
 
B. Justifications Based on Cognitive Limitations of Consumers 
 
In addition to the traditional market failures described above, recent research in 
behavioral economics has highlighted the potential for inefficient market outcomes that result 
from consumers’ cognitive limitations. The division between these cognitive limitations and the 
neoclassical justifications for governmental intervention can admittedly blur at times, but there 
are important differences in their analytical frameworks and policy implications. Neoclassical 
justifications locate market failures in the structure of markets and the incentives faced by 
individuals and firms, whereas behavioral justifications locate the failures in the mental 
processes of individuals.
10 Beyond this difference in orientation, the behavioral economics 
research often suggests different kinds of governmental interventions, in particular, measures 
designed more to correct biases and reorient consumer decision-making rather than to proscribe 
business activities or dictate the terms of exchange (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
 
Present-biased preferences. Present-biased preferences (Strotz, 1955; Laibson, 1997) 
generate a type of externality in which the decisions of an individual today negatively impact the 
welfare of the same individual in the future in a way that is not internally consistent and that 
implies future regret. This type of negative externality is sometimes referred to as an 
“internality.” Present-biased preferences have been used to explain behaviors as diverse as 
failing to save for retirement and taking up smoking. The proposed policy responses to such 
preferences are to constrain today’s self from taking actions that would be too detrimental to the 
future self, and could include limiting early access to retirement saving or taxing consumption of 
cigarettes. 
 
Cognitive limitations and financial illiteracy. Recent research has documented a 
pervasive lack of basic financial literacy (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2007; Lusardi, 
Mitchell and Curto, 2010; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). For example, consider the answers to a 
short set of financial literacy questions first added to the Health and Retirement Study in 2004 
and subsequently incorporated into several other national and international surveys. Table 3 lists 
these questions and the answers of respondents to two such surveys. Among the older Health and 
Retirement Study Respondents, only 56% correctly answer the first two questions, and only 24% 
get all three questions correct (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006). The younger NLSY respondents fare 
even worse, with only 46% answering the first two questions correctly, and 27% getting all three 
questions right (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 2010). 
 
A lack of financial literacy need not be problematic if, as Milton Friedman suggested, 
consumers learn to behave optimally through trial and error, much as a pool player need not have 
                                                 
10 The possibility that firms might exploit these biases to enhance profits creates a further rationale for government 
intervention (Barr et al., 2008).   10
any knowledge of physics in order to play pool well (Freidman, 1953). But there is growing 
evidence that consumers make avoidable financial mistakes with non-trivial financial 
consequences (Agarwal et al., 2009; Campbell, 2006; Choi et al., forthcoming). Moreover, these 
mistakes are more common among consumers with lower levels of education and income 
(Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2007 and 2009) and who are less financially literate (Kimball and 
Shumway, 2007). While cognitive ability is difficult to measure in a way that can be matched to 
financial data, there is some evidence that consumers who perform better on cognitive tests make 
better financial decisions in laboratory experiments (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2006) and 
earn higher returns on their equity portfolios later in life (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 
2009). 
 
If consumers cannot maximize their own welfare, there is no reason to believe that 
competitive markets will be efficient. A social planner can in principle achieve better outcomes, 
judged using the true welfare function of consumers, than a free market that responds to the 
biased decisions that financially illiterate consumers make.  This is true both because financially 
illiterate consumers may pick inappropriate financial products, and because real resources may 
be wasted as firms seek to persuade consumers to purchase excessively expensive, and hence 
profitable, products. Such rent-seeking behavior creates deadweight loss.   
 
In practice, of course, it is difficult for regulators to know the true objectives of 
households. But in certain cases outcomes may be improved by regulations on market conduct 
that reflect the presumed judgment of what most consumers would want, were they fully 
informed and well advised. This logic underpins the libertarian paternalism or “nudges” 
discussed at length by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Other examples include mandatory capital 
requirements and portfolio restrictions on depository institutions, prior approval regimes 
regarding the integrity of personnel in many areas of the financial services industry, and the 
many mandatory restraints on the structure of mutual funds and other financial firms.  
 
Trust. Consumers with cognitive limitations may use rules of thumb to guide their 
behavior. One such rule of thumb is to avoid the use of certain financial products altogether 
(Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2009; Cole and Shastry, 2009). This has been interpreted as a 
lack of trust in the financial system (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008). Since lack of 
financial market participation can be a serious mistake, there is a case for regulation to improve 
consumer trust through such things as restrictions on insider trading, suitability and fiduciary 
requirements, and other measures that convey a sense of strong supervisory oversight.
11 There is 
evidence that mutual fund markets with stronger levels of investor protection are larger than 
those with lower levels of protection (Khorana, Servaes and Tufano, 2005), perhaps working 
through this channel of trust. 
 
 Self-knowledge. Markets may work poorly if consumers do not correctly understand their 
own time-inconsistent preferences or cognitive limitations, in other words, if they lack self-
knowledge. For example, consumers may choose a bank account with “free” checking, 
underestimating the extent to which they will pay penalty fees for overdrawing their accounts in 
                                                 
11    Interventions to promote trust are analytically similar to traditional economic justifications of regulation as 
means to facilitate long-duration financial contracts, which were discussed earlier.    11
the future. Such lack of self-knowledge leads to several problems. First, naïve consumers may 
purchase too many bank services because they underestimate the total cost to them. Second, 
banks compete away the excess profits they obtain through overdraft fees by keeping base 
charges low on checking accounts. This implies that naïve consumers cross-subsidize 
sophisticated consumers who don’t overdraw their accounts. Products that allocate costs more 
equally across naïve and sophisticated consumers cannot be successfully brought to market as 
sophisticated consumers find it attractive to retain the cross-subsidies embedded in existing 
products. Nor is it profitable for firms to educate naïve consumers, because educated consumers 
become sophisticated and then demand fewer high-cost financial services. Finally, there are 
troubling distributional implications because naïve consumers are likely to have lower incomes 
than sophisticated consumers. This “shrouded equilibrium” has been modeled by Gabaix and 
Laibson (2006). Campbell (2006) presents evidence that similar phenomena are important in 
mortgage markets.  
 
C. Distributional Considerations and Consumer Financial Regulation 
 
Even when unregulated markets are efficient, they may generate unacceptable 
distributional outcomes. While in principle this can be addressed by social welfare programs and 
progressive income taxation, distributional considerations also motivate some consumer financial 
regulation. As noted earlier, consumers with high search costs are likely to pay higher prices in 
unregulated markets. In some contexts, search costs are higher for those with a high value of 
time and are likely to be positively correlated with income. Aguiar and Hurst (2007), for 
example, show that middle-aged consumers pay higher prices than do retired consumers because 
they spend less time shopping. In consumer financial markets, however, search costs may be 
more correlated with cognitive ability and financial experience than with the value of time. 
Individuals of limited cognitive ability or financial expertise may have higher search costs 
because they lack easy access to information or the capacity to process it, and thus may pay high 
prices for financial products even though they have low incomes. Distributional considerations 
thus strengthen the case for measures to reduce search costs or to limit the ability of firms to 
exercise market power over consumers with high search costs.  
 
Distributional concerns also motivate regulatory restrictions on the ability of financial 
firms to vary pricing of certain products, even when there is variation in the underlying cost of 
delivering services. Current legislation about certain credit products is predicated on the logic 
that low-income consumers should not pay more than high-income consumers for credit. In some 
auto insurance markets, state laws prohibit setting insurance premiums on the basis of geography 
or age. In the area of consumer credit, various federal statutes, including the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act and the Federal Housing Act, prohibit price discrimination based on race and 
various other individual characteristics. And, in the case of depository institutions, the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 requires firms to serve the credit needs of low and 
moderate income borrowers. Other forms of this logic, framed around universality, have 
motivated measures to subsidize access to financial markets by lower-income consumers.   
 
 
IV.  The Structure and Mechanisms of Consumer Financial Regulation 
   12
In the United States, a complex system of government agencies, statutory structures, and 
implementing regulations exists to regulate consumer financial markets. Both federal and state 
agencies play important roles as do the courts and various private bodies. The mechanisms of 
regulatory interventions–that is, the regulatory requirements and supervisory techniques–are also 
multi-faceted. In this section of the paper we offer an overview of this legal regime. 
 
A.  The Regulatory Structure of Consumer Financial Markets 
 
  The core of our system of financial regulation is organized around the three traditional 
financial sectors of deposit-taking, trading in securities or other capital market instruments, and 
insurance (Jackson and Symons, 1999). Before entering these lines of business, firms must 
usually obtain an operating charter or license from the appropriate authorities and then comply 
with required regulations, submit periodic reports, and undergo regular examinations to ensure 
compliance with regulatory standards.  One important function of financial regulators is to enjoin 
the unauthorized provision of these regulated financial services.  
 
  While in other developed countries the oversight of the financial services industry has 
been moving toward more consolidated operations, the United States retains an idiosyncratically 
fragmented system of financial supervisory oversight (Government Accountability Office, 2009).  
Depository institutions, for example, can have either federal or state charters. The federal 
government has three chartering agencies (the Comptroller of the Currency for commercial 
banks, the Office of Thrift Supervision for thrifts, and the National Credit Union Administration 
for credit unions) as well as two other supervisory bodies (the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and the Federal Reserve Board) which share jurisdiction over state-chartered banks.  
This fragmented system of chartering can promote beneficial regulatory competition among 
government agencies, but can also lead to regulatory arbitrage and lax oversight. 
 
In the area of capital markets, there are two federal agencies (the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission) that maintain divided 
jurisdiction over securities and commodities markets with state regulators offering supplemental 
oversight of securities firms, smaller investment advisers, and other areas of the securities 
business. Self-regulatory organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulation Association 
(FINRA), contribute an additional layer of consumer protection in capital markets through quasi-
governmental structures that combine industry participation and public oversight.   
 
States are the most important regulators of insurance companies, with a complex system 
governing various lines of insurance (e.g., life and health insurance versus property and casualty) 
and insurance intermediaries (agents as opposed to underwriters or reinsurers). The federal 
government provides supervision of some important insurance products, most notably employer-
provided health insurance, pensions and retirement savings plans. Federal and state governments 
also directly provide many forms of social insurance, including Social Security, Medicare and 
Medicaid, unemployment insurance, workers compensation, and flood insurance.  
  
  Some financial statutes are cross-cutting. For example, the privacy provisions of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act apply to all sectors of the financial services industry as well as to 
financial information retained by firms that do not engage in traditional financial activities.   13
Enforcement, however, is delegated to sectoral regulators for regulated firms and the Federal 
Trade Commission for unregulated firms.   
 
Other consumer financial statutes deal with specific financial functions. The Truth-in-
Lending Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, for example, apply to most forms of 
consumer credit. Some statutes apply more narrowly: the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Home Owners Protection Act of 1998, and the Secure 
and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act relate only to mortgages. Other statues 
address different features of consumer finance, including the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Credit Repair Organization Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act, and the Truth in Savings Act. 
 
Jurisdictional authority over these statutory requirements is complex and inconsistent. In 
many areas of consumer finance, especially areas involving consumer credit and payments 
systems, the Federal Reserve Board has had the authority to establish implementing regulations 
but enforcement is left to other agencies with direct oversight of regulated firms. In other cases, 
notably those tied to residential mortgages, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
has had some rule-making authority.  In still other areas, such as the oversight of credit repair 
organizations–that is, firms that purport to assist consumers in improving their credit scores–the 
Federal Trade Commission plays a leading role. The new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection will centralize oversight of many of these consumer finance statutes (Department of 
Treasury 2009), although supervision will, in some cases, remain delegated to traditional front-
line supervisory agencies in versions of the legislation pending in Congress.  The Bureau’s 
primary jurisdiction is largely limited to banking products – the provisions of credit, the 
collection of savings, and payment services – and does not extend to insurance, securities or 
employer-based fringe benefits, including retirement savings.    
 
  At the state level, various consumer financial protection laws prohibit unfair and 
deceptive practices; additional protections against unscrupulous business practices derive from 
common law doctrines in contract and tort law. In addition, the states maintain a variety of 
licensing and oversight arrangements for non-traditional financial intermediaries, such as 
mortgage brokers, real estate agents, payday lenders, pawnshops, check-cashing operations, and 
other specialized providers of financial services. Sometimes these entities are indirectly overseen 
by other regulators; for example, alternative financial service providers typically need to work 
with regulated banking partners. 
 
The relationship between state-based consumer financial protection systems and federal 
law is at times controversial, especially where state authorities have attempted to apply local 
standards to federally chartered commercial banks or thrifts (Schiltz, 2004). The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act includes provisions that clarify the relationship 
between state and federal consumer finance regulation and expand the authority of state officials 
to police some aspects of the activities federally-chartered firms. 
 
  State and federal bankruptcy and tax laws also affect the structure of consumer financial 
markets. The bankruptcy code defines the conditions under which consumers can be discharged 
of financial obligations. Of particular note, some types of debt (e.g. mortgages secured by a   14
primary residence and student loans) are more difficult to restructure in bankruptcy than others, 
and conversely, certain assets (e.g. employer sponsored savings plan balances and IRAs) are 
protected from creditor claims in bankruptcy (White, 2009; Jacoby, 2010). Similarly, the tax 
code favors certain types of assets, expenditures and debt. Mortgage interest is generally 
deductible from federal taxable income; most expenditures on employer-provided fringe benefits 
(notably health insurance, pensions, and retirement savings accounts) are not included in taxable 
income; and certain types of savings and capital accumulation receive tax preferences (Bittker 
and Lokken, 1999). 
 
Finally, the financing programs of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have profoundly impacted the evolution of consumer credit over 
the past half century. This is most evident in mortgage markets, but these innovations in 
mortgage finance have facilitated comparable mechanisms of private financing for other types of 
consumer credit (at least until market contractions following the recent financial crisis). 
 
B.  The Mechanisms of Regulatory Intervention  
 
  To address the market failures and distributional concerns outlined above in Part III, 
governmental authorities employ a vast array of regulatory tools. In this section, we follow 
Jackson (1999) and consider these various regulatory options, organized loosely from less to 
more interventionist, and concluding with several strategies that rely more on private actions 
than public oversight. 
 
  These interventions do not easily or precisely map onto the economic justifications for 
consumer financial regulation outlined earlier. Neither legislators nor regulatory agencies 
routinely justify their actions in purely economic terms. Political considerations and the views of 
key constituencies often play a major role in shaping the choice of regulatory tools. Government 
officials are sometimes subject to regulatory capture and fail to pursue policies that actually 
advance the public interest, whether defined in economic or other terms (Stigler, 1971). 
 
  Still, developing a catalog of regulatory options is instructive. Doing so may facilitate the 
formulation of preliminary hypotheses as to which approaches or combination of approaches 
would most suitably address the principal market failures associated with consumer financial 
markets. And one may also begin to develop criteria by which government authorities might 
ascertain which kinds of consumer financial transactions warrant the costs associated with more 
heavy-handed forms of intervention.
12   
 
Consumer Education and Financial Literacy Programs. Some of the simplest forms of 
government intervention in consumer financial markets are efforts to improve the financial 
literacy of consumers, either through curricular innovations in primary and secondary school 
education or through more general educational efforts (Hillman, 2009).  A number of 
                                                 
12 A partial list of considerations might include: size of potential injury (e.g., inappropriate mortgage vs. problematic 
gift card); lack of consumer sophistication (education, experience with products, etc.); limited capacity of consumers 
to protect self; salience of market forces; availability, efficacy, and cost of disinterested advice; product complexity 
(e.g. pricing, terms); and existence of cognitive biases or limitations (see Jackson, 2007).   15
government programs are intended to promote such educational efforts, although the evidence of 
their efficacy is mixed at best.  
 
 Anti-Fraud Rules. Another traditional method of consumer protection is through anti-
fraud rules which create a cause of action against parties that engage in intentionally deceptive 
selling practices. One innovation of the New Deal era federal securities laws was to expand the 
scope of anti-fraud rules for securities transactions to materially misleading omissions as well as 
misleading affirmative statements and to offer a host of procedural advantages to aggrieved 
purchasers or sellers of securities. Loosely analogous remedies are available under ERISA for 
deceptions arising out of employer benefits plans, but such liability rules are less common for 
banking and insurance transactions.    
 
 Disclosure  Requirements. Perhaps the most straightforward response to information 
asymmetries is through disclosure requirements. Such requirements differ on a variety of 
dimensions. Some consist of affirmative obligations to disclose specific information about a 
product or provider. The SEC’s disclosure rules for corporate issuers, for example, specify in 
considerable detail the kinds of information corporate issuers must include in their SEC filings 
and provide to investors under certain circumstances. Often the content of disclosures will be 
structured in highly prescriptive ways so as to facilitate consumer comparison across products. 
Examples include the annual percentage interest rate disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act 
for consumer credit and the annual, three-year, and five-year investment performance disclosure 
requirements for mutual funds.  In some contexts, disclosures must be tailored to individual 
transactions, as is the case with settlement costs for home mortgages under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act. Finally, in contexts where it is difficult for customers to judge the 
significance of disclosures regarding individual transactions–for example, in securities 
transactions when the concern is whether a broker has achieved adequate price improvement–
disclosures are required on an aggregate basis reflecting a large number of transactions over an 
extended period of time (Jackson 2008).  
 
Fiduciary Duties. Another important category of legal protections in consumer finance 
are fiduciary duties. Typically imposed in situations where firms or individuals have 
discretionary control over the financial decisions of their customers, fiduciary duties impose 
legal obligations on fiduciaries to safeguard their clients’ interests. In consumer finance, 
fiduciary duties are commonly imposed where a firm is giving financial advice or is engaged in 
the retail distribution of financial products.
13  Similarly, ERISA imposes a wide range of 
fiduciary duties on the parties involved in the provision of employee benefit plans. 
  
  In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, “to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the 
analysis.”
14 The scope and content of fiduciary duties can vary considerably across context 
                                                 
13 One source of confusion among both consumers and industry experts is the variation of fiduciary duties across 
different sectors of the financial services industry.  While securities brokers are subject to an extensive system of 
fiduciary duties imposed under both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the requirements of FINRA, much less 
onerous obligations are imposed on selling agents in the insurance industry and on mortgage brokers (Jackson and 
Burlingame, 2007). 
14 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).   16
(Langbein,1995). In some fields, such as securities regulations, fiduciary duties are defined by 
elaborate regulatory guidelines with clear requirements for determining, for example, whether 
fiduciaries have complied with suitability requirements or satisfied duties to obtain best 
execution. There are also differences in whether fiduciary duties can be waived through adequate 
disclosure and knowing consent on the part of the party or whether the duties are non-waivable. 
In the former case, the fiduciary duty can become little more than an open-ended disclosure 
requirement where the disclosing party bears the burden of establishing that the counterparty 
knowingly ascents to the disclosed terms. In the latter case, the duty functions more as a 
mandatory term of business. An example of the second category would be the FINRA mark-up 
rules which prohibit securities firms from marking up the price of securities by too great an 
amount when selling securities to customers from the firm’s own account. 
 
  Non-Binding Standards. Another category of regulatory intervention that has become 
increasingly popular in recent years are default rules, opt outs, opt ins, and safe harbor 
provisions, which steer firms towards organizing their affairs in a certain way, but without 
imposing an outright mandate. Default rules are common in contracts and impose terms that 
presumptively apply unless the parties clearly choose to agree to other terms. Under federal 
securities laws, the default rule is that customers aggrieved with their broker-dealers can seek 
redress in federal courts, but firms can and typically do contract out of that regime by including 
an arbitration clause in agreements executed before opening new accounts. With opt-out 
requirements, a provider can establish its own policies, but the consumer must be given the 
opportunity to opt-out of that policy. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act rules for financial privacy 
protection are a good example. (Swire, 2003) With opt-in requirements, providers can only offer 
a service if a customer affirmatively chooses to accept the service, as is the case with the Federal 
Reserve Board’s new rules on overdraft protection for electronic transactions. With a safe harbor 
provision, a firm is typically insulated from potential liability under some open-ended fiduciary 
standard if the firm complies with specific rule-like terms. So, for example, 401(k) plan sponsors 
can insulate themselves from various forms of liability by offering participants a range of 
diversified investment choices accompanied by certain disclosures.   
 
  In certain contexts—most notably where many but not all consumers would benefit from 
a certain requirement regime—non-binding standards may be preferable to mandatory 
requirements, which have less flexibility and may inhibit mutually beneficial transactions.   
Policy analysts focusing on the cognitive limitations of consumers sometimes advocate non-
binding standards as an effective means of nudging consumers towards what are assumed to be 
better financial decisions while leaving latitude for those with strong preferences to make other 
choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In devising these standards, a key concern is the degree of 
“stickiness” in the standard, that is, the degree of difficulty that consumers face in choosing to 
work outside the transaction.  Also of concern is the extent to which financial services firms can 
steer consumers away from non-binding standards when it would be profitable to do so (Barr, et 
al., 2008).  
 
   Mandatory  Requirements. A large number of consumer financial regulations take the 
form of mandatory requirements imposed on service providers and products.  In many areas, 
there are licensing or chartering requirements before firms or individuals can engage in 
regulated activities. These are meant to ensure that providers have the requisite knowledge and   17
experience and, in some cases, to prevent individuals with records of fraudulent past behavior 
from positions of responsibility or trust. Another set of mandatory requirements dictate the 
permissible structure of the balance sheet and business activities of financial intermediaries and 
their affiliates. These portfolio shaping rules, which include capital requirements, restrictions on 
investments, and regulation of the form of firm liabilities, are intended to reduce the riskiness of 
financial intermediaries and ensure their capacity to honor their commitments when they come 
due.
15 In certain sectors, financial intermediaries are also required to obtain third-party 
guarantees of their obligations. For example, most regulated depository institutions are required 
to participate in government-sponsored deposit insurance programs, and other financial service 
providers are often required to arrange private bonding arrangements before starting business.
16    
 
  In some areas, mandatory requirements limit the form of financial products. For example, 
commercial banks are generally prohibited from offering secured deposits, lest one class of 
depositors obtain a priority in liquidation procedures. Similarly, the investment terms of mutual 
funds must include daily repricing and redemption of shares based on current market values of 
the underlying mutual fund portfolio. Consumer insurance products are extensively regulated 
with numerous restrictions on the form of permissible contracts. 
 
  Another category of mandates prevalent in consumer finance are anti-conflict rules which 
are designed to prevent the managers and controlling shareholders of financial intermediaries 
from applying the resources of the intermediary or customer funds for their own benefit. So, for 
example, commercial banks are limited in their ability to extend credit or engage in other 
transactions with affiliates. Comparable rules govern insurance firms and investment companies.  
The federal securities laws include similarly spirited requirements designed to prevent broker-
dealers from misusing customer funds and securities. Some anti-conflict interventions take the 
form of restrictions on information flows–so-called “Chinese Walls”–designed to prevent 
employees dealing with customers from being pressured by other employees in ways that might 
be detrimental to the customers’ interests. A good example are the settlements that arose out of 
the analysts’ scandals of the late 1990s which imposed a series of structural barriers designed to 
prevent the investment banking side of securities firms from influencing the recommendations of 
affiliated analysts (Agarwal and Chen, 2008).  
 
  The existence of such extensive and often costly mandatory requirements for consumer 
financial products creates considerable incentives for parties to restructure their interactions so as 
to fall outside of regulatory requirements. In some areas, the law includes important explicit 
exemptions from regulatory requirements. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 includes the 
“private placement” exemption that relaxes the disclosure standards and liability for securities 
sold to sophisticated and wealthy investors. Similarly, the Investment Company Act of 1940 
offers comparable exemptions that allow hedge funds and other alternative investment products 
to escape the onerous requirements imposed on mutual funds and other registered investment 
companies. Beyond these statutory exemptions, creative providers (and their attorneys) routinely 
                                                 
15 Portfolio shaping rules are also important to prevent systemic risks from the failure of financial institutions.  
16 Organizational structure is also sometimes used as a regulatory instrument as when financial institutions are 
encouraged or required to organize in mutual form rather than the more familiar corporate structure with 
shareholders serving as residual claimants.   18
seek to characterize their products as “mere” contracts so as to escape mandatory requirements 
and operate under the more liberal common law rules of “caveat emptor.”   
     
Price Controls and Rate Regulation. Price controls sometimes figure into consumer 
financial regulation. Usury rules, which restrict interest rates, are perhaps the most familiar 
example of this approach. While legal developments permitting depository institutions to export 
interest rates from the state of their choice has greatly weakened the efficacy of usury laws, for 
many consumer financial transactions, including payday lending, local usury rules are still 
relevant. Price controls in the form of rate regulation are sometimes used in the insurance 
industry, and all states prohibit the use of certain risk classifications (often including gender and 
sometimes geography) to set prices. The federal government recently added restraints on the use 
of genetic information to set insurance prices. Recently enacted federal health care reform 
imposes new restrictions on the ability of health insurers to discriminate among customers due to 
pre-existing medical conditions. Even in the securities field, there are restrictions on the pricing 
of certain consumer financial services, including distribution costs charged to mutual fund 
shareholders.  Finally, anti-discrimination laws prohibit discrimination based on race and other 
suspect categories in the extension and pricing of credit.  
 
  Mechanisms of Enforcement. Enforcement is an important component of consumer 
financial regulation and consists of a variety of overlapping elements, including report 
requirements (both public and confidential); mandated internal controls (increasingly assigned to 
a chief compliance officer reporting to the highest levels of management); periodic 
examinations, including (in some sectors) examinations focused primarily on consumer 
protection issues; public enforcement actions ranging from informal to administrative to civil and 
then potentially criminal; and in some areas of consumer finance, most notably securities and 
employee benefit plans, robust private rights of action. 
 
Third Party Validation. The public regulation of consumer finance is sometimes 
supplemented through systems of third party validation. One familiar example of this strategy is 
the common requirement that independent auditors review the financial statements of regulated 
intermediaries on an annual basis. But financial regulations also have increasingly relied on 
outside credit rating agencies as external (and, as it turns out, not particularly reliable) arbiters of 
permissible investments for regulated firms. In a different vein, the Investment Company Act of 
1940 makes extensive use of independent directors to safeguard the interests of mutual fund 
shareholders, especially with respect to transactions when the interests of shareholders and 
investment company managers may be in conflict. 
 
Supplemental Private Policing. Finally, our system of consumer financial regulation also 
often depends, and in some cases facilitates, the use of private policing. In the mutual fund 
industry, private vendors such as Lipper and Morningstar play an important role in digesting a 
massive amount of publicly available information about mutual funds and synthesizing that 
information for customers. Another area in which private order plays an important role is the 
sharing amongst financial firms of information about consumer defaults and credit performance. 
This collection of information permits the development of individual credit scores, which allows 
firms to determine credit risks and develop more accurate prices for loans and other credit   19
transactions.
17  Finally, in a variety of areas, industry groups promulgate standards of best 
practices, against which industry participants can assess their own practices. While these 
standards do not typically have formal legal standing, they often influence regulatory 
developments in the future and can form a sort of soft law around which many industry 
participants organize their operations in the short term. 
 
Overlapping Strategies in Practice:  One of the challenges of empirical studies into the 
efficacy of the different components of consumer financial regulation is that the components are 
rarely implemented in isolation.  Rather, in most important areas of consumer finance, multiple 
forms of regulatory intervention are employed. The regulation of mutual funds, described below 
in our fourth case study, offers a good example.  The mutual fund industry is often cited as a 
sector of the financial services industry that has benefited from successful and effective 
regulation, and the growth of the sector over the past several decades is consistent with that 
claim.  But even accepting the assumption that effective regulation played an important role in 
the industry’s success, it is difficult to ascertain whether some particular element of the mutual 
fund regulation made the critical contribution or whether the full smorgasbord of mutual fund 
oversight was necessary for the sector’s success. 
  
 
V. Case Studies of Consumer Financial Markets and Their Regulation 
 
  To illustrate how the themes discussed above apply to specific consumer financial 
markets we turn now to three case studies. In each, we discuss the market failures that are most 
relevant, the evolution of government regulation and its impact of firms and consumers, and the 
scope for further regulation to remedy existing problems.  The case studies are (1) financing 
consumption in retirement, (2) residential mortgages, (3) payday lending; and (4) mutual funds 
 
Cast Study 1: Financing Consumption in Retirement 
 
Financing consumption in retirement illustrates many of the conditions under which retail 
financial markets may fail. The process of accumulating wealth for retirement when young and 
transforming that wealth into consumption when older involves long-term financial 
commitments that are large and consequential for most households. Moreover, many aspects of 
this particular problem allow for little direct or social learning—most of us only get to 
experience retirement once, and common shocks limit the extent of social learning. 
 
  In the U.S., the three largest financial resources of the elderly are home equity, social 
security benefits, and the value of employer-provided pension or retirement savings account 
balances. To this list we might also add a fourth significant financial resource—the implied value 
of the health insurance provided either by the government through Medicare or through former 
employers. This enumeration highlights one interesting aspect of the financing of retirement 
                                                 
17  This particular area of innovation has led to additional consumer financial regulation to protect consumers from 
errors in the creation of credit scores and abuses from firms that purport to have the capacity to improve an 
individual’s credit score.   20
consumption: In addition to the role played by financial institutions, employers and the 
government are also significant actors. 
 
  Government provision of retirement income is widespread (all major developed countries 
have some sort of social security system) and usually ascribed to various market failures such as 
under-saving (as a result of present-biased preferences) and adverse selection in the markets for 
retirement annuities and health insurance as well as to distributional concerns for the poor 
elderly. In the U.S., employer involvement in financing retirement consumption is largely 
motivated by the tax code which excludes from taxable income both employee and employer 
contributions to employer-sponsored pension and retirement savings plans. But employers are 
also in a unique position to help solve some of the problems that might otherwise lead to market 
failure, which may provide a motivation for subsidizing employer involvement in this market 
through the tax code. For example, employers may reduce search costs for employees by vetting 
financial providers, they may mitigate adverse selection by pooling individuals into employee 
groups, and they may alleviate problems that arise due to limited cognition or lack of financial 
literacy by acting as an agent on behalf of their employees. Employers may also negotiate better 
terms with financial providers than employees could obtain individually. 
 
  Beyond its direct role in providing retirement income through social security, government 
also regulates both financial service providers and employer provision of pensions and retirement 
savings plans. The evolution of government regulation over the past four decades, the 
relationship between regulation, financial service providers, employers and consumers, and the 
resulting changes in the market for financing retirement consumption illustrate the potential for 
government regulation to reshape markets in dramatic ways, sometimes intended and at other 
times not. 
 
For several decades, the predominant form of employer-provided retirement income was 
the traditional defined benefit pension plan.  In 1975, participants in employer sponsored defined 
benefit pension plans outnumbered participants in defined contribution plans by 2.4 to 1 
(Department of Labor 2007). This situation began to change in the 1980s, precipitated by a series 
of new laws and regulations. The first, the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 
1974 (or ERISA), was intended to protect current and former employees and their beneficiaries 
from employer abuses such as the underfunding of promised pension benefits or onerous vesting 
requirements. ERISA was followed in 1978 by the addition of section 401(k) to the Internal 
Revenue Code. A subsequent clarification in 1981 allowed employers to exclude employer and 
employee 401(k) contributions from taxable income. 
 
None of these regulatory changes was passed with the intent to transform the pension 
landscape. The 401(k) plan was originally envisioned as a savings vehicle to supplement, not 
supplant, traditional defined benefit pension plans. But given the higher costs and regulatory 
restrictions imposed on defined benefit plans following ERISA, the 401(k) plan quickly became 
an attractive substitute for employers. By 2007, defined contribution participants outnumbered 
defined benefit participants by 3.4 to 1, a striking and completely unanticipated reversal from 
three decades earlier (Department of Labor, 2007). 
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  In a defined benefit plan, employees have few choices to make:  the employer determines 
the benefits to be paid in retirement and makes the contribution and investment choices 
necessary to make good on the promised benefits. In a traditional 401(k)-style defined 
contribution plan, employees choose how much to save and how to invest their contributions. 
The actual savings outcomes in these plans illustrate many of the problems discussed above that 
may give rise to market inefficiencies. Plan participation, contribution rates, and asset allocation 
outcomes are all heavily influenced by employer defaults, even when the costs of opting out are 
small (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2004; Thaler and Benartzi, 
2004; Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2005; Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2009); 
participants chase past returns in both their asset allocation and contribution rate choices 
(Benartzi, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2004 and 2009); they fail to rebalance 
(Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi, 2006); and their asset 
allocation choices are sensitive to the structure of the investment menu (Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007). These outcomes are suggestive of both present-
biased preferences and cognitive limitations on the part of defined contribution plan participants.  
 
  Concern that savings outcomes in defined contribution plans were suboptimal motivated 
several key provisions in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), the biggest regulatory 
reform of pensions and retirement savings plans since ERISA. The PPA includes inducements 
(safe harbors) for employers to structure their savings plans to incorporate automatic enrollment, 
automatic contribution escalation, and a diversified default asset allocation. These plan features 
help circumvent the tendency for employees with present-biased preferences to delay 
participating in an employer-sponsored savings plan or to choose a contribution rate that may be 
too low. Passage of the PPA is credited with driving significant increases in the fraction of plans 
that have such features.  For example, Fidelity Investments (2009), the largest 401(k) plan 
administrator in the U.S., reported a 70% increase in the fraction of its sponsors offering 
automatic enrollment between 2007 and 2009. By 2009, nearly half of its participants were in 
plans with automatic enrollment.  Fidelity also reports that nearly all (96%) of its automatic 
enrollment plans now use target date funds as their default investment option.
18 This is a striking 
change from earlier years, when the default investment funds chosen by employers were 
predominantly money market or stable value funds. Park (2009) estimates that nearly 7% of 
401(k) assets were invested in target date funds at the end of 2008. This fraction is likely to 
increase substantially in the coming years as more 401(k) plans adopt automatic enrollment and 
as the fraction of employees who have been automatically enrolled into such funds increases. If 
so, this would mark a significant change in the nature of 401(k) investments. 
Whether these provisions of the Pension Protection Act improve long-run retirement 
income security remains to be seen. There is the possibility that these measures may increase 
savings within defined contribution savings plan but only by crowding-out savings elsewhere or 
by increasing consumer debt. But recent evidence on savings-related crowd-out suggests that the 
effects are largely confined to higher income households (Engelhardt and Kumar, forthcoming). 
In any case, there is certainly scope for further regulation within the current defined contribution 
                                                 
18 Target date funds include a mix of domestic and international equities, bonds, and short-term securities. The 
allocation between these asset classes changes over time as investors approach retirement   22
dominated system.
19 First, regulation can promote access: employer sponsored savings plans are 
limited to those whose employers offer them, and coverage is by no means universal. Pending 
legislation would establish automatic IRAs, a step in the direction of expanding access to 
workplace-based savings plans (Iwry and John, 2009).  
Second there is a case for regulation to promote annuitization of retirement wealth.   
Retirees face a problem of how to liquidate their holdings to fund living expenses.  Few 
individuals annuitize any part of their defined contribution account balances at retirement even 
though most economic models suggest that they should, a fact commonly referred to as the 
“annuity puzzle”.
20  Such regulation could take the form of tax incentives for annuitization, 
mandated full or partial annuitization (as is the case in the U.K.), or inducements for plan 
sponsors and financial service providers to innovate in the creation of annuity-like products that 
could be incorporated into defined contribution savings plans. 
Third, the investment options in employer-sponsored savings plans are not necessarily 
appropriate for the task they are designed to facilitate. Employer stock is a commonly available 
and popular investment choice in the savings plans of publicly traded firms, even though its risk 
properties (it is undiversified and its returns are correlated with the returns on labor income) 
make it a poor investment choice. Conversely, investment options that do make sense, notably 
longer-term illiquid investments that carry a liquidity premium, are not part of the mutual funds 
that populate plan investment menus because they are not amenable to the daily valuations of 
such funds. Regulation to align plan investment options with investor needs is warranted. 
 
Cast Study 2:  Residential Mortgages 
 
The residential mortgage market is another illustration of many of the themes of this 
paper. Just as in the case of retirement saving, government policy has had an enormous influence 
on the U.S. system of housing finance.  For the last 75 years, the dominant mortgage form in the 
U.S. has been the long-term, nominal, amortizing fixed rate mortgage (FRM). This type of 
mortgage, unusual in other countries, has been fostered by implicit public subsidies through the 
government sponsored entities (GSEs), most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   
 
Negative externalities from foreclosures 
 
One rationale for government policy in this area is a public interest in reducing the 
incidence of foreclosures.  There is evidence that foreclosures not only damage foreclosed 
properties, but also reduce the prices of neighboring properties (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak, 
2009).  The negative effect on the neighborhood is an externality that will not be taken into 
account by private lenders even if, as suggested by Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen (2009), 
their foreclosure decisions are privately optimal.   
                                                 
19 Some are less sanguine about the potential for adequately reforming defined contribution savings plans and have 
called instead for completely scrapping the current system in favor of mandatory savings schemes (Ghilarducci, 
2008) or a return to defined benefit pension plans.   
20 The annuity puzzle is not restricted to defined contribution participants—an increasing fraction of defined benefit 
pension beneficiaries are opting to take a lump-sum at the time of retirement rather than the tradition annuity.   23
 
The U.S. experience during the Great Depression suggests the importance of this point.  
In the late 1920’s the dominant mortgage form was a short-term balloon loan that required 
frequent refinancing.  When low house prices and reduced bank lending capacity in the early 
1930’s prevented many homeowners from obtaining sufficient new mortgage credit to pay off 
their maturing loans, the result was a wave of foreclosures that exacerbated the Depression.  
Many observers are concerned that a similar process is unfolding today.   
 
Foreclosures can be reduced ex ante, by encouraging mortgage forms such as FRMs that 
pay down principal over time and thus rely less heavily on foreclosure to protect the interests of 
the lender; and ex post, by regulations that encourage or require mortgage modification as an 
alternative to foreclosure.  The Obama Administration has subsidized mortgage modification 
with limited results.  A more radical alternative, discussed by White (2009), would be to alter the 
bankruptcy code to allow bankruptcy judges to modify mortgage terms. 
 
Consumer cognitive limitations 
 
Consumer cognitive limitations provide a second rationale for mortgage regulation.  For 
many households, mortgages are both the largest and most important financial arrangements that 
they make and a serious challenge to their cognitive abilities.  A great variety of mortgages are 
available, some of which are complex and pose risks that are difficult even for financial 
professionals to thoroughly understand.  Mortgage costs appear in a number of forms, not all of 
which are straightforward to measure.  Households take out mortgages relatively infrequently, 
and often negotiate them at the same time that they are moving homes. Under these 
circumstances it is unlikely that all households make perfectly optimal decisions. 
   
The choice of mortgage form 
 
One important aspect of mortgage choice is the decision between a FRM and an 
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).  The FRM has some important advantages.  The predictability 
of nominal payments simplifies the household’s financial planning problem provided that 
inflation is relatively stable. The mortgage has an option to refinance, protecting the household 
against unexpected declines in inflation during the life of the mortgage that would otherwise 
increase the real debt burden.   
 
However the FRM is not a perfect financial instrument.  It has at least three major 
problems.  First, the real value of the mortgage is extremely sensitive to inflation.  Given a 
refinancing option, the mortgage amounts to a massive one-way bet on inflation, in which 
homeowners benefit if inflation erodes the real value of their debt, but can refinance to a lower 
nominal interest rate if inflation falls. The inflation exposure of nominal FRM lenders creates 
systemic risk to financial institutions, a fact that became apparent in the U.S. during the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1970s and 1980s.  Once lenders become aware of inflation risk, they 
compensate for it by charging high rates for long-term nominal FRMs.  In countries with more 
volatile inflation histories than the United States, this has made these mortgages prohibitively 
expensive. 
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Second, long-term nominal FRMs require homeowners to decide when they should 
refinance.  Given the monetary and time costs of refinancing, this is not a trivial decision and, in 
fact, is an example of a sophisticated “real options” optimal investment problem.  Campbell 
(2006) presents evidence that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many households paid higher 
mortgage rates than they needed to, particularly less educated and less wealthy households. 
 
Third, an environment of rising house prices and declining interest rates, of the sort that 
existed in the United States during the 1990s and early 2000s, presents an opportunity for 
refinancing homeowners to extract home equity by increasing their mortgage balances.  To the 
extent that homeowners have present-biased preferences, this is a dangerous temptation that 
reduces saving (Khandani, Lo, and Merton, 2009).   
 
There are of course alternatives to the long-term nominal FRM that mitigate these 
problems.  The adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) amortizes the nominal principal of the mortgage 
loan in a similar fashion to the FRM, but charges an interest rate that adjusts to variations in 
market rates and therefore indirectly to variations in inflation.  Over the lifetime of an ARM the 
real present value of mortgage payments is approximately invariant to inflation, there is never 
any reason to refinance to obtain a lower interest rate, and therefore refinancing does not tempt 
homeowners to extract home equity.  Furthermore, an ARM normally has a lower interest rate 
than a FRM since lenders need not charge homeowners the cost of a one-sided bet on inflation.  
For these reasons Alan Greenspan (2004) famously argued that some U.S. homeowners would 
benefit by shifting from FRMs to ARMs.   
 
However, the ARM has problems of its own.  Although the present value of ARM 
mortgage payments is invariant to inflation, the cash flow consequences are material.  An 
increase in inflation increases nominal payments today by more than the increase in the price 
level – that is, it increases required real payments – to compensate lenders for the erosion of the 
real value of their principal. This acceleration in the required repayment schedule causes serious 
problems for households that lack alternative means to borrow, a point emphasized by Campbell 
and Cocco (2003).  More generally, the variation in required nominal interest payments 
complicates the household’s financial planning problem and may be hard for some households to 
understand.
21   
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, new forms of ARMs emerged that added to these 
problems. Because ARMs do not have fixed monthly payments, it is comparatively 
straightforward to alter their terms to require lower payments initially.  It became common to 
offer a low initial “teaser rate”, which was sometimes fixed for a number of years in “hybrid 
ARMs”, and during the initial period lenders sometimes waived required principal payments in 
“option ARMs”.  After the initial period, many of these mortgages charged penalty interest rates 
which made it highly desirable to refinance them if at all possible.  These mortgages are similar 
to those that prevailed in the U.S. before the Great Depression in that they lead to defaults and 
                                                 
21 Bucks and Pence (2008) present evidence that households with ARMs systematically underestimate the degree to 
which their mortgage interest rates can vary over time.   25
require foreclosures if refinancing is not available.  However, they are considerably more 
complex and therefore harder for households to evaluate and manage.
22 
 
Economists have suggested alternative mortgage forms that may be superior to any of 
those observed in the marketplace.  For example, an automatically refinancing FRM with no 
home equity extraction would address two of the three problems with a conventional FRM.  By 
automatically lowering required monthly payments when long-term nominal interest rates 
decline sufficiently, such a mortgage would eliminate discretion over refinancing and the 
temptation to deplete home equity at refinancing dates.  An inflation-indexed FRM, whose 
payments would increase with the price level, would eliminate the remaining problem of 
inflation sensitivity.  In a similar spirit, ARMs could be constructed with level nominal or real 
payments and a principal balance that adjusts to variation in short-term nominal interest rates.  
Finally, some economists have advocated mortgages with principal balances that automatically 
adjust to the regional level of house prices (Shiller, 2008).   
 
If such contracts would be superior to existing mortgage forms, why do they not appear 
and indeed dominate the marketplace?  One general response is that given the cognitive 
challenges facing households, there is only a weak presumption that financial innovation will 
offer genuinely advantageous products to households; it is just as likely that innovators will 
design superficially attractive products that cater to household behavioral biases.  In support of 
this view, it is striking how different types of mortgages dominate in different developed 
countries, even though the underlying financial problems of households are similar in the United 
States and many parts of Europe.  Some of this cross-country variation may be explicable by 
different inflation histories and government policies, but to the extent that the best solutions to 
household financial problems are similar everywhere, the diversity of mortgages across countries 
suggests that financial markets are not consistently providing these best solutions.   
 
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) have suggested one mechanism that can inhibit useful 
financial innovation. If some households lack awareness of their own cognitive limitations, they 
may fail to anticipate their inability to refinance a conventional FRM optimally.  Such 
households will pay higher mortgage rates than they need to, generating profits to mortgage 
lenders that in competitive equilibrium lower the interest rates on conventional FRMs.   
Sophisticated households, who do know how to refinance their mortgages, will find conventional 
FRMs to be attractively cheap because they benefit from a cross-subsidy from naïve households.  
Therefore sophisticated households will not wish to take out an automatically refinancing FRM, 
and financial entrepreneurs offering such a product will not be able to win customers either by 
advertising to sophisticated households or by educating naïve households to become 
sophisticated.  
 
There are several ways in which consumer financial regulation can help improve the 
forms of mortgage contracts.  Most obviously, disclosure requirements can facilitate risk 
                                                 
22 Miles (2003) presents intriguing evidence that households in the UK, where ARMs with teaser rates are standard, 
failed to manage them properly in the early 2000s.  He shows that almost 1/3 of UK households were paying a 
higher rate than they could get by taking out a new ARM.  Similarly, it has been claimed that many U.S. households 
took out complex subprime mortgages during the recent credit boom even though they would have qualified for 
cheaper prime mortgages.     26
comparison across mortgage forms.  In this regard it is key to offer households measures of risk 
as well as expected cost. Standard APR calculations are helpful for comparing mortgages with 
similar risks, but not for comparing FRMs with ARMs, or for comparing ARMs with different 
initial fixed-rate periods, interest rate caps, and other complex features. 
 
An alternative approach is to promote standard mortgages.  The case for doing this is that 
one or two standard mortgages may be reasonable choices for most households; if these 
mortgages are offered as a default option, many households will choose them and this may 
reduce the incidence of financial mistakes. 
 
In the past, U.S. government sponsorship of the GSEs subsidized long-term nominal 
FRMs and helped them become de facto standard mortgages.  The costs of this policy became 
apparent during the recent financial crisis when the government was forced to assume losses 
incurred by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  A more explicit regulatory policy favoring certain 
mortgages, for example by lowering capital requirements on banks holding them, or by requiring 
consumers to qualify for non-standard mortgages, may be a preferable alternative.
23  
 
Given the well documented problems with existing mortgage contracts, it is important not 
to choke off the development of new and potentially superior mortgages.  If certain mortgages 
are given favorable treatment as standard mortgages, new products should be considered for this 
treatment if it can be shown that they meet consumer needs and are comprehensible to 
households considering them.  An important function of the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection will be to evaluate proposed new products through economic analysis and field 
research.  
 
Cost comparison 
 
  An equally important aspect of mortgage choice is cost comparison.  Mortgage costs take 
different forms, some being included in the interest rate and others charged up front.  A mix of 
one-time and recurring costs is particularly hard to evaluate because their relative importance 
depends on the length of time that the mortgage is held.  Standard APR calculations assume that 
mortgages are held to maturity and can be seriously misleading for mortgages that are typically 
refinanced after a few years.   
 
Consumer financial regulation can simplify the task of cost comparison in several ways.  
The existence of standard mortgages is helpful in itself, because households can concentrate on 
standard mortgage terms rather than considering a vast array of special features.
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Disclosure policy is obviously relevant, and both the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development have recently augmented disclosure 
                                                 
23 The Federal Reserve Board’s 2008 amendments to regulations implementing the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act impose new and stringent underwriting standards for “higher priced mortgage loans” associated with 
the subprime crisis.   
24 Woodward (2003) presents evidence that households pay lower mortgage fees when all fees are rolled into the 
interest rate, simplifying the task of cost comparison.     27
requirements surrounding mortgage originations.  There is however an important issue of making 
disclosures comprehensible to consumers and available in a timely manner, during the period of 
comparison shopping rather than at the time of closing on a house purchase. Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008, Chapter 8) have proposed that mortgage terms be made available electronically in 
standardized form to permit the development of online sites for comparison shopping.   
 
  An alternative approach is to regulate the mortgage origination process.  In 2008, 
Congress passed the Safe Mortgage Licensing Act with the goal of establishing minimum state 
standards for licensing mortgage originators.  A more drastic approach would be to establish a 
fiduciary duty for mortgage brokers.   
 
Cast Study 3: Payday Lending 
  
  To illustrate how the themes discussed above in Sections III and IV apply to specific 
consumer financial markets we turn now to a case study involving payday loans (PDLs):   
relatively small, short-term, generally unsecured loans that are often sold to less well-to-do 
consumers, many of them at a physical point of sale. This form of lending has grown rapidly in 
recent years, and the industry now estimates loan volume at roughly $40 billion per year.
25  
 
Background 
 
  Most PDLs follow a relatively standard lending process and take a relatively standard 
form. Consumers visit a storefront location, request a loan, have their employment verified, and 
if approved, walk out minutes later with the loan proceeds. The average PDL is fairly small--
80% of transactions are for less than $300 (Stegman, 2007). The loan comes due on the 
borrower’s next payday and is extinguished by either an explicit payment from the borrower, a 
pre-arranged ACH withdrawal from the borrowers’ bank account, or by cashing a post-dated 
check. The time until the next payday, and hence loan maturity, can range from a few days to 
nearly a month, but the norm is two weeks. Instead of a finance charge that varies with balance 
and duration of the loan, the fee is either fixed or related simply to the loan amount, typically $15 
to $30 per $100 borrowed (Stegman, 2007). 
  
In some states, borrowers can repay the loan (plus fee) by rolling it over to a new, higher 
balance loan. Some states limit same store roll-overs to no more than four or five per year; in 
others, they are prohibited entirely. Even in such states, nothing prevents a borrower from getting 
another loan elsewhere. According to Elliehausen (2009), 40% of payday loan consumers used 
more than one payday lender within a 12 month period, and of those, over 35% used a PDL from 
one lender to pay off another.
26    
                                                 
25 Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) is the national payday lending industry 
association: http://www.cfsa.net. Caskey (1994, 2001, 2002) provided some of the earliest research documenting 
this form of what he called “fringe banking.” For a more recent overview of PDL, see Stegman (2007). 
26 Many other studies also document sizeable repeat PDL usage. Stegman and Farris (2003) report that the average 
PDL user took out seven loans in 2000, and the Center for Responsible Lending reports that 90% of loans were 
made to borrowers with five or more transactions per year (Parrish, 2008). Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find 
that 20% of PDL customers rolled over more than eight loans in a twelve month period. Flannery and Samolyk 
(2005) find that 46% of store PDL transactions were rollovers, accounting for 34-40% of total loan volume.   28
 
  By virtue of the product itself, PDL customers must have a checking account and be 
employed. Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find that PDL customers tend to have a moderate 
level of education and are disproportionately young (under age 45) and have children. Most are 
from lower and middle-income households with limited liquid assets—fewer than half report any 
savings (Elliehausen, 2009).
27 Generally, they are in life stages where demand for credit is high, 
and although 92% rely on other types of credit, many have been denied credit in the past 12 
months, have credit cards at the limit, have concerns about their ability to access credit, and are 
less likely to have home equity to tap (Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001; Lawrence and 
Elliehausen 2008). 
 
Payday lending grew out of the check cashing industry of the 1990s and the leading 
industry association reports almost 24,000 outlets nationally.
28 The industry is fairly dispersed 
with only a few large corporations holding any substantial share of the market—most payday 
lenders are small storefront operations.
29 The few studies on payday lending profitability rely on 
self-disclosed figures, and hence may not be representative or objective, but suggest that the 
business is not as profitable as critics charge. Flannery and Samolyk (2005), for example, 
analyzed data for 300 stores in two chains. They conclude: “fixed operating costs and loan loss 
rates do justify a large part of the high APRs charged on payday advance loans” and that loan 
volume, rather than repeat borrowing per se, is a primary determinant of profitability. Similar 
conclusions are reached by Tufano and Ryan (2009) who conduct a case study of a single chain, 
and by Huckstep (2007) and Skiba and Tobacman (2007) who examine the financial statements 
of publicly traded payday lenders.   
 
Applying the Regulatory Justifications to Payday Loans.  
 
Earlier in Section III we outlined several rationales for regulation of consumer financial 
markets. Here we consider their application to payday loans. 
 
Traditional market failures seem an unlikely basis for regulation of PDLs. There is little 
evidence of market power.
30 The apparent absence of abnormal profits may reflect competition, 
the small scale of most operations, the requirements for both local real estate and personnel, and 
loan losses. In some low income communities, the number of PDL outlets far exceeds the 
                                                 
27 The most-reported household income levels of PDL customers are: $25,000 to $39,999 (27.6%), $15,000 to 
$24,999 (17.6%) and $50,000 to $74,999 (16.7%). Nearly all PDL borrowers have a high school diploma (91.2%) 
and many have some college (35.1%) (Elliehausen 2009).  See also Stegman and Faris (2003).  One can also 
characterize borrowers with regard to their larger pattern of financial service experiences. Lusardi and Tufano 
(2009) find that payday borrowers are more likely than others to engage in related high cost financial transactions. 
28 See http://www.cfsa.net/about_cfsa.html. 
29 Stegman (2007) estimates that six large companies control about one-fifth of all PDL activity. 
30 However, as Mann and Hawkins (2007) argue, the most convenient locations for customers are more expensive, 
which may privilege established firms, put a “natural limit on the density with which profitable locations can be 
established” and “hinder the effectiveness of price competition.” DeYoung and Phillips (2009) conclude that loan 
pricing reflects strategic considerations, with fees rising to legislated ceilings and with large multi-store firms 
charging higher prices than independent single store operators.   29
number of banks and even fast food restaurants.
31 Given the prevalence of PDLs in selected 
neighborhoods and the relatively standard terms in the industry, it is reasonable to suppose that 
consumers have low search costs. Similarly, there don’t appear to be asymmetries of information 
or public good aspects of payday lending that would justify additional information regulation, 
although standardized APR disclosures required of payday lenders under the federal Truth-in-
Lending Act do provide a useful baseline of information, which might not be available in an 
entirely unregulated market.  
 
There is mixed evidence on whether PDLs generate externalities. Some evidence 
suggests that PDLs lead to financial hardship, which could give rise to greater need for public or 
private redistribution ex post.  Other evidence suggests that PDLs may give rise to positive 
externalities: Morse (2009) finds that households facing natural disasters were less likely to 
experience foreclosures or larcenies when PDLs were more accessible. Wilson et al. (2010) 
replicate Morse’s general result using a laboratory experiment with 318 undergraduate subjects 
who had to manage a household budget over 30 periods. They found that the addition of PDLs to 
a mix of credit products helped subjects absorb expenditure shocks. Comparative evidence from 
Oregon, which imposed a PDL interest rate cap, and the neighboring state of Washington, which 
did not, shows that restricting access to PDLs causes “deterioration in the overall financial 
condition” of households (Zinman, 2008).  This evidence suggests that PDL may be better than 
its alternatives. 
 
By contrast, other studies find that PDLs are associated with increased financial hardship, 
and thus perhaps negative community externalities. Melzer (2009), for example, exploits 
geographic and temporal variation in the availability of PDLs and finds that loan access leads to 
increased difficulty paying mortgage, rent and utility bills; a higher rate of moving out of one’s 
home due to financial difficulties; and delayed medical care, dental care and prescription drug 
purchases.
32 There also is evidence that PDLs are associated with adverse outcomes for military 
borrowers, including declines in overall job performance and lower levels of retention (Carrell 
and Zinman, 2008). To discourage PDLs to military personnel, the 2007 National Defense 
Authorization Act caps the fees on payday loans to service members at a 36% APR, a regulation 
that industry critics support for all payday lending (CRL Research Brief, 2009). 
 
Behavioral considerations for PDL regulation include both cognitive limitations and 
present-biased preferences of borrowers. There is a limited amount of direct and indirect 
                                                 
31 The geographer Graves (2003) reports that PDL and bank branches are inversely related, with loan stores growing 
in areas where banks are exiting: poorer communities with a larger fraction of minorities.  Morse (2009) reports the 
number of PDLs per zip code in California in 2007 was twice as large as the number of McDonalds restaurants (1.9 
vs. 0.95). 
32 Using a regression-discontinuity approach applied to borrower-level data from Texas, Skiba and Tobacman 
(2009) conclude that loan approval for first-time PDL applicants increases the likelihood of Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
filings by 2.5% through two channels: a selection effect—higher risk borrowers both seek PDLs and go bankrupt; 
and repeated borrowing. In contrast, Stoianovici and Maloney (2008) use state-level data and find no relationship 
between PDLs and bankruptcy filings. Morgan and Strain (2008) find that PDL restrictions increase credit problems 
such as the incidence of bounced checks. However, using finer data, Campbell, Martinez-Jerez and Tufano (2008) 
find fewer involuntary bank account closures due to overdrafts after Georgia banned payday lending, especially for 
individuals farther from state borders where PDL was available nearby.   30
evidence that PDL users may have cognitive limitations. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) find that 
PDL borrowers and users of other forms of non-traditional credit have low levels of debt literacy 
(an understanding of interest compounding). As part of a field experiment, Bertrand and Morse 
(2009) asked PDL borrowers about the interest rate charged for their loans. About 40% claimed 
the APR was around 15%, confusing the cash charge per hundred dollars and the APR (or they 
misunderstood the question). Some PDL borrowers take out loans even when they have access to 
lower cost credit in the form of unused credit card borrowing capacity (Agarwal, Skiba and 
Tobacmann, 2009) or savings and checking account balances (Carter, Skiba, Tobacmann, 2010). 
While there may be a logical reason for these choices (e.g., lower intra-family disclosure or 
avoidance of overdraft fees), to the extent that they demonstrate a failure to understand the 
relative costs of alternative forms of credit, the “diagnosis” might be one of cognitive failures. 
Finally, as noted earlier, there is substantial evidence of repeat or chronic borrowing.
33 In states 
allowing rollovers, borrowers can quickly see their borrowing balloon out of control. This could 
reflect cognitive limitations of PDL borrowers; it could be indicative of present-biased 
preferences—individuals underweight the future costs of taking out a PDL today; or, it could 
simply reflect the fragile economic state of many PDL users. Collectively this evidence is 
consistent with a behavioral basis for regulation, even if the empirical evidence is still rather 
limited.  
 
The distributional arguments for regulating PDLs are straightforward: the poor (or poor 
financial managers) pay more. As noted above, PDLs are used disproportionately by less well off 
individuals. Critics charge that PDLs are in fact targeted to (and thus used by) lower income 
consumers and racial minorities (Graves, 2003; Stegman and Faris, 2003). Critics further argue 
that PDL  pricing is “predatory”—typical fees of $15-$20 per $100 borrowed imply an APR 
from 390% (if paid back at the two-week deadline) to over 1000% (if repaid within one day). In 
some regulation, such as the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOPEA), the 
mere existence of high APRs, defined in reference to prevailing rates, is the basis for regulation.   
 
While detractors argue that PDLs result in the poor paying more, one must ask “more 
than what?” Defenders of PDLs point out that other sources of short-term credit, such as 
overdraft protection, returned check fees, and credit card late fees, have APRs ranging from 
478% to 791%, depending on the duration of the loan (Consumer Reports, 2005; Lehman, 2005).  
Furthermore, the costs of not having access to credit can be extraordinarily high. For example, if 
electricity or telephone service is shut off, the time and expense to restart service can far exceed 
a PDL fee.
34 Similarly, a worker lacking the funds to repair a vehicle may be unable to get to 
work and may lose her job as a result.   
 
The effects of payday lending on household welfare depend on the assumed alternative to 
PDL usage. If PDLs were not available, some households may find less convenient but perhaps 
                                                 
33 A report by the Center for Responsible Lending (King et al., 2006) claims that repeat borrowers generate 90% of 
the revenue of the PDL industry. However, Veritec, LLC, a data provider for the industry, disputes these statistics in 
a report dated January 18, 2007 (see http://www.cfsa.net/veritec.html).  
34 The Community Financial Services Association of America (2006) commissioned a study to document the fees of 
PDL alternatives. Their findings are: late fees for utilities, $9.92; utility reconnect fees, $36.24; insufficient funds 
fees, $28.34; and bank overdraft fees, $23.18.   31
less expensive financing, or may resist the temptation to engage in short-term spending. Other 
households, however, may use more expensive forms of short-term credit, or suffer severe 
consequences from lack of credit. Which counterfactual one believes will inform one’s view of 
appropriate regulation; the existing empirical evidence provides mixed answers.   
 
Existing Regulation 
 
  In response to the efforts of several national banks that were attempting to establish 
nationwide distribution networks through local payday lenders, federal banking authorities took a 
series of steps starting in 2000 to discourage federally-insured depository institutions from 
participating in payday lending (Smale, 2005). As a result, payday lending is largely conducted 
and regulated at the state level (Peterson, 2008). Georgia prohibits payday lending entirely and 
nine other states effectively prohibit it as a result of interest rate caps that make it unprofitable.
35   
Annual interest rate caps also exist in some states with payday lending, including Ohio (28%), 
New Hampshire (36%), Oregon (36%), and Virginia (36%). The Truth-in-Lending Act requires 
that the loan amount, finance charges, and APR must be clearly disclosed in any contract or 
agreement the borrower signs. Thirty states have more stringent disclosure laws, requiring 
payday lenders to clearly and prominently post APRs and fee schedules inside their stores.
36 
Many states limit the maximum loan amount, and some states, such as California, prohibit roll-
over loans. Thus, the range of regulatory practices extend from an outright or de facto ban 
(through low permissible APRs) on one extreme to disclosure requirements on the other, with a 
middle ground of restrictions on contract terms (e.g. repeat usage).   
   
Policy considerations 
 
  The discussion above highlights the problems with crafting optimal regulation of payday 
lending. While distributional considerations and externalities may form the case for regulation, 
there is conflicting evidence about whether PDLs benefit or harm consumers. Likely they do 
both.  Used “responsibly” as an alternative to even higher cost borrowing or the failure to pay 
certain bills, PDLs are likely beneficial—as the industry argues. But when used repeatedly, they 
can lead to ballooning debt and distress—as critics argue. Any regulation must address how the 
product is used by the borrower.    
 
Regulation cannot deal with PDLs in isolation. Taking the functional perspective, PDLs 
are just one form of short-term credit. Regulation restricting one product can lead consumers to 
seek other, possibly even less attractive, sources of credit. That PDLs are used in conjunction 
with other short-term credit products reminds us that any regulation must assist consumers in 
making decisions that cut across various products. This “help” might come in the form of 
education or disclosures. 
                                                 
35 These are: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont and West Virginia. See regulations by state at the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/BankingInsuranceFinancialServices/PaydayLendingStateStatutes/tabid/12473/
Default.aspx. 
36 Fox and Woodall (2006), however, report that three fourths of surveyed payday lenders failed to post the APRs as 
required by law, and 20% posted no cost information at all.     32
 
If behavioral considerations are the basis for greater regulation, then we need to know 
more about what drives PDL choice before we can craft more effective (and appropriate) 
regulation. Well designed disclosure can in principle help consumers make better decisions, but 
existing research calls into question whether it will substantially change behavior. A recent 
randomized field experiment by Bertrand and Morse (2009) tested different types of PDL 
disclosures. They find that fee disclosure in dollar terms was more effective in reducing same 
store PDL demand than APR disclosures
37 or messages about the likelihood of repeat borrowing 
or the importance of budget planning. However, the absolute reduction in subsequent borrowing 
was modest (5 to 6% depending on the specification), and the experiment could not assess 
whether reduced borrowing at the participating payday lender was offset by borrowing from 
other payday lenders. Overall, these results raise questions about the efficacy of disclosure 
rules.
38 
 
To the extent that the most problematic use of PDLs relates to repeat usage, the 
underlying failure could be either behavioral or structural (in that people are systematically 
living beyond their means). If the former, it might be possible to employ other behaviorally-
informed regulatory changes (Barr et al., 2008). For example, if PDL borrowing is an impulse 
item, then a short “cooling off” period might give people time to consider whether they really 
want a loan. In the market for tax refund anticipation loans, many consumers are willing to 
accept a wait of one or two days for payment rather than incur additional fees to access their 
impending tax refunds on the same day as they file (Cole et al., 2008). If the problem is 
structural in that people simply can’t manage their money, barring rollovers—or PDLs 
altogether—won’t address the basic issue that gives rise to the product. 
 
It seems sensible that policymakers should test the likely impact of any proposed rule 
changes. The experiments cited above were mostly conducted by scholars, rather than by the 
policymakers charged with rule-making. Most academics, however, seek to publish papers, and 
do not have the time nor inclination to test micro-variations in rules. As a result, some form of 
research needs to be carried out by policymakers themselves. 
 
While regulation may seek to protect consumers, it needs to be mindful of the economics 
of this business. It is difficult to make the case that most lenders are earning supernormal profits.   
However, pending House and Senate bills (H.R.1608 and S.500) would cap interest rates at a 
36% APR, similar to the limit imposed on payday loans for military personnel in 2007.  For a 
$300 two-week loan, a 36% APR rate cap would limit the lender’s total revenue to $4.15 
(300*0.36/26). According to Flannery and Samolyk (2005), average loan losses alone were $5.72 
per loan for the most mature stores, before accounting for the cost of wages, buildings, 
advertising or overhead. A 36% APR ceiling would not create “affordable” PDLs, but could 
                                                 
37 The conclusion that dollar-based versus APR disclosure is most informative echoes the results of Hasting and 
Tejeda-Ashton (2008) who find a similar result in their study of responses to fee disclosure for investment accounts 
in Mexico. 
38 Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2010) and Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (forthcoming) find that mutual fee 
disclosures are similarly ineffective.   33
instead lead to the exit of existing vendors. More generally, rate caps could lead to new products 
or practices that skirt the rules,
39 or push payday lending underground.  On the other hand, rate 
caps and other PDL restrictions could spur legitimate innovation into products that are both 
better for consumers and profitable for firms. 
 
Finally, the correlated use of PDLs and other short-term lending products and the growth 
of the PDL industry probably reflects desire by consumers for access to short-term credit.  A 
different regulatory approach would be to encourage alternatives to PDLs. Before she assumed 
her role as Chairman of the FDIC, then-academic Sheila Bair (2005) reviewed PDL alternative 
models. Among her conclusions, she called for regulatory encouragement for low-cost short-
term loans. As FDIC Chair, she launched a pilot program to demonstrate the potential for these 
products, although the results are so far fairly limited. While some forms of regulation can 
stymie innovation, they can also spur it either in the cat-and-mouse fashion of the regulatory 
dialectic as described by Kane (1981) or in the encouragement to pilot new ideas. 
 
Cast Study 4:  Open-End Mutual Funds 
  
Mutual funds are collective investment vehicles in which large numbers of individual 
investors pools their resources under common management to invest in a diversified pool of 
assets. A distinguishing characteristic of open-end mutual funds is that investors are allowed to 
buy and redeem shares on a daily basis, at a price equal to the fund’s calculated net asset value.  
In the absence of effective government oversight, mutual funds would suffer from potentially 
serious market failures.  To evaluate the performance of funds, individual investors require 
extensive information that would be difficult to assemble and verify in the absence of assistance 
from fund management.  In addition, mutual-fund disclosures are most useful if the disclosures 
are prepared in a common format that facilitates comparison across different mutual funds. 
Collective investment vehicles also suffer from numerous potential agency problems, in that 
management could face incentives to divert fund resources to benefit either management or 
preferred classes of shareholders in the absence of regulatory restrictions.  In addition, 
investments with mutual fund tend to be long term commitments and investors risk opportunistic 
behavior on the part of fund management and other shareholders absent credible oversight and 
enforcement mechanisms.  This litany of problems is not merely hypothetical: in the first half of 
the twentieth century, the mutual fund industry was plagued with many of these issues.  (Jackson 
and Symons, 1999) 
 
Unlike our other cases studies, mutual funds represent an area of consumer finance that 
has operated under a comprehensive and relatively stable system of supervisory oversight for 
more than half a century and has largely addressed the issues above.  Indeed, the regulation of 
mutual funds in the United States offers a good example of overlapping (and arguably redundant) 
regulatory strategies to address an interconnected set of market failures. (Frankel and Kirsch, 
2003; Coates, 2008) At the center of mutual fund regulation is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) which enforces the Investment Company Act of 1940.  This Act strictly 
regulates the structure of mutual funds, imposing severe restrictions on liabilities and complex 
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capital structures, establishing elaborate rules for daily pricing of shares for sale and redemption, 
and setting significant diversification requirements for fund assets (supplemented through further 
diversification requirements effected through the internal revenue code).  In addition to these 
stringent portfolio-shaping rules, the Act and implementing SEC regulations mandate that 
independent boards of directors police many aspects of fund business, especially transactions, 
like advisory contracts, where management could exploit investors through excessive fees.   
Further fiduciary duties are imposed on fund advisers and the securities firms that distribute 
mutual fund shares, and the amount of fund resources that can be spent on distribution activities 
are strictly constrained.  In addition, extensive disclosure requirements are imposed on mutual 
funds (including both fund specific information and disclosure formats designed to facilitate 
comparison across funds) and a substantial private industry of rating systems and publications 
digest and interpret fund disclosures for the investing public.  To monitor compliance with 
regulatory standards, SEC and FINRA staff members perform regular examinations of all mutual 
funds on a periodic basis and routinely bring and publicize enforcement actions against 
offending firms.  Under a range of statutory provisions, private litigants can and do sue mutual 
fund companies and related parties for, among other things, misleading disclosures, excessive 
fees, or abusive sales practices.  Finally, the Investment Company Institute and several other 
trade groups play important roles in developing best practices and conducting research relevant 
to industry participants.
40     
 
As a complex and highly visible example of government oversight, mutual fund 
regulation has over the years been subjected to a host of criticisms across a range of topics.
41 
Mutual fund disclosure requirements have been characterized as both insufficient and 
excessively burdensome.  Fiduciary oversight from independent directors has been labeled both 
inadequately vigorous and needlessly intrusive, in particular in negotiating lower fees for 
investors.  One area of concern has been the use of fund resources to finance the costs of 
distributing fund shares, a practice that gave rise to considerable litigation in the 1960’s and 
1970’s and has subsequently been channeled into SEC-supervised but still controversial practices 
of allowing fund advisers to fund certain research activities with soft-dollar payments and the 
impose 12b-1 fees to cover distribution costs.  And, scandals of the last decade involving market 
timing and late trading – practices whereby management firms allowed some shareholders to 
benefit from excessive or after-hours fund transactions at the expense of ordinary investors – 
have raised questions as to whether existing supervisory safeguards were sufficient.  
 
But the indisputable and overarching empirical fact about mutual funds has been their 
phenomenal growth over the last six decades. As of year-end 2009, U.S. mutual funds held more 
than $11 trillion in assets, equivalent to over 77.5 percent of the 2009 GDP.
42  By comparison, in 
                                                 
40     Money market mutual funds are subject to even more regulatory restrictions under SEC Rule 2a-7 and raise 
distinctive policy concerns, especially with respect to the level pricing that this rule permits.   
41    For a somewhat dated but still useful overview of investment company regulation and potential areas of reform, 
see United States Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Investment Management (1992). 
42    See Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1: Flow of Funds Account of the United States (Mar. 11, 2010) 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf, visited 5/4/2010).   35
1950, the industry held only $2.5 billion in assets, less than one percent of GDP at the time. 
(Jackson and Symons, 1999) As a fraction of household financial assets, mutual funds 
constituted less than one percent of household financial market assets in 1950, and has grown to 
more than 21 percent by year end 2009.  (Investment Company Institute, 2010) Simplistically, 
some argue that regulation can foster innovation through regulatory arbitrage, or can inhibit it 
through restrictions: neither of these characterize the fund industry.  Rather, the fund industry has 
seen extensive innovation in the number and types of funds despite extensive regulation.  While 
a variety of factors no doubt contributed to this growth, many industry observers cite the role of 
effective regulatory oversight and supervision as critical to helping the industry overcome 
adverse public opinion arising out of abuses in the 1920’s and 1930’s and earning the confidence 
of the investing public in the latter half of the Twentieth Century.
43  Recent evidence suggests 
that investor protection is an important part of the success of the US industry.  In two studies of 
mutual funds across multiple countries, specific elements of fund investor protection were shown 
to be associated with fund growth, the share of primary assets held by funds, and lower fees.  
(Khorana, Servaes and Tufano 2005, 2009).  After controlling for fund type, fund size, and other 
relevant variables, fund fees in the US were among the lowest in the world.  More specifically, 
while some have argued that fund boards are insufficiently independent, a number of studies 
have found evidence that effective board structure is associated with lower fees, quicker 
resolution of poor performance through mergers, and greater vigilance with respect to market 
timing policing (e.g., Tufano and Sevick 1997, Khorana, Wedge and Tufano 2007, Zitzewitz 
2003) 
 
  Notwithstanding this positive evidence, much academic and policy attentions has focused 
on the level and composition of mutual fund fees, most importantly the payments that 
management companies and their affiliate receive from fund assets.  As mentioned earlier, a 
number of empirical studies have detected puzzling variation in the levels of fees imposed on 
indexed mutual funds that pursue identical investment strategies. (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004)   
A large body of work has raised questions about the value of the generally higher fees paid for 
active management of mutual fund portfolios. (Swenson, 2005)  And yet other studies have 
questioned the benefits to investors who purchase mutual fund shares through independent 
brokers, as opposed to direct sales from mutual fund companies. (Bergstresser, Chalmers and 
Tufano, 2009.)  Collectively, these studies raise questions about the cognitive capacities of at 
least some investors to monitor fund fees effectively.   More generally, some industry critics 
have questioned whether mutual fund shares have appropriately shared in the substantial 
economies of scale that the industry has achieved through its growth over the past several 
decades. (Freeman and Brown, 2001.) Other analysts have pointing to conflicting evidence 
suggesting that competitive pressures have exerted downward pressure on management fees, but 
upward pressure on distribution costs.   (Coates and Hubbard, 2007). 
 
                                                 
43    Beyond this impressive rate of growth, the mutual fund industry often operating under SEC exemptive orders 
has made a number of major innovations in product design, including the money market mutual funds that offer a 
substitute for bank deposits, multi-class funds that allow funds to attract investments from different distribution 
channels, exchange traded funds that provide greater liquidity, and most recently target date funds that offer 
automatically rebalancing portfolios matched to the expected retirement date of investors.  (Lerner and Tufano, 
2009)   36
  The appropriate scope of mutual fund regulation is an issue of ongoing debate.  One 
controversy concerns whether certain investment restrictions for money market mutual funds 
should be tightened—or be held to bank regulatory standards, but little question that regulation 
itself should be scaled back.  (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010.)In 
other developed countries, most collective investment vehicles are organized and regulated as 
UCITS (Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferrable Securities) a contractual 
structure that is much less heavily regulated than American mutual funds.  A number of 
commentators have suggested that UCITS-style investment vehicles should also be available in 
the United States, to increase investor choice and provide competition for traditional mutual 
funds.  (Coates, 2009; ICI, 2007; SEC Division of Investment Management, 1992) On the 
domestic side, the 1940 Act includes a number of exceptions that permit other forms of 
collective investment vehicles, most notably hedge funds and private equity funds, to operate 
under much less stringent regulations provided investors are marketed only to a small number of 
investors or those with substantial wealth.  Analysts differ as to whether the narrowness of these 
exemptions are important safeguards for retail investors or unnecessary constraints on 
investment choice. (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003.) Finally, some 
financial services firms --  for example, banks with collective trust funds and insurance 
companies with equity indexed annuities – offer products that are functionally similar to mutual 
funds, and experts differ whether the proliferation of functionally similar products under 
different legal requirements represents a beneficial form of legal innovation or a disruptive 
instance of regulatory arbitrage. (Coates, 2009) 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
  In this paper we have described a number of rationales for regulatory intervention in 
consumer financial markets.  Some of these relate to economists’ traditional concerns about 
asymmetric information and imperfect contracting, others to a more recent appreciation for the 
limits of consumer rationality.   
 
  It is important, however, to keep in mind the limitations on the ability of regulation to 
improve financial outcomes for consumers.  Politicians and regulators can easily do more harm 
than good if these limitations are ignored. 
 
  First, many consumer financial products are expensive to provide because of the small 
size of each consumer transaction.  In the market for short-term consumer credit, for example, it 
is inevitable that small loans will be expensive unless they are organized through a long-term 
relationship that can amortize fixed costs over many related transactions.  In such markets, APR 
ceilings therefore have the unintended effect of eliminating provision of one form of short-term 
credit and potentially forcing some consumer to rely on more expensive alternatives. 
 
  Second, there is important cross-sectional variation in the financial products that are 
suitable for different consumers.  For example, homeowners who expect to move in the near 
future should not pay for the expensive refinancing option embedded in a long-term nominal 
fixed-rate mortgage.  Similarly, payday loans may be helpful for certain consumers and harmful 
for others.  Regulators should be cautious about imposing “one size fits all” solutions.   37
 
  Third, even in markets where commonly used financial products seem satisfactory, these 
products are often not perfect and can potentially be improved by financial innovation.  In the 
market for retirement savings products, for example, even the best current investment solutions, 
such as lifecycle mutual funds, lack any mechanism for giving consumers access to less liquid 
asset classes that might earn them an illiquidity premium. 
 
  Fourth, regulation can easily have unintended consequences if market participants use 
financial innovation to circumvent clumsily designed or costly regulations.
44 A leading example 
is the 1974 reform of defined benefit (DB) pension regulations which inadvertently encouraged 
the growth of the defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans. DC plans do have some 
advantages relative to DB plans, for example, their greater portability as employees move from 
one job to the next; but they also impose a more substantial burden on households to self-manage 
their retirement savings, a responsibility many households appear ill-suited to bear. It is not clear 
that the current U.S. system has achieved an optimal balance between DC-like and DB-like 
retirement plans. In the case of payday lenders, the decision of regulators to exclude federally 
insured depository institutions from participating in payday lending may have served largely to 
move that activity to smaller, local firms that are both less efficient and more difficult to 
supervise. 
 
  Finally, all regulation is subject to the political process which can easily capture 
regulation and use it to achieve short-term political goals rather than the originally intended 
economic goals.  It appears, for example, that politicians’ desire to extend credit access to lower 
income households was a contributing factor in the development of the subprime mortgage 
market, the recent housing and credit bubbles, and ultimately the financial crisis of 2007-09. 
 
  Given these potential problems, any regulatory agency, including the new Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection should follow a disciplined process when considering new 
financial regulations. The first step must be to identify specific problems such as those we 
discussed in section III and in our case study.  The second step is to design metrics for success in 
addressing these problems. For example, if the problem is the wide dispersion in the fees that 
consumers pay for extremely similar products such as index mutual funds, metrics for success 
could include an increase in consumer knowledge of available low-cost options, or a decrease in 
the dispersion of fees that consumers actually pay.  The third step is to tailor interventions to the 
problems at hand, taking into account the wide range of regulatory mechanisms and combination 
of mechanisms potentially available The fourth step is to implement research to determine 
whether candidate interventions actually can deliver improvements in the metrics for success 
from the second step. 
 
  This last step is a substantial challenge in itself, and will require a broad array of research 
methodologies. Some evidence can be gathered from aggregate data, for example, in measuring 
the adequacy of retirement saving from statistics on the participation rate in 401(k) plans. This 
                                                 
44 The fragmented structure of the U.S. system of financial oversight and the capacity of firms to use different legal 
forms to provide similar financial functions create additional opportunities for regulatory arbitrage on the part of the 
financial services industry (Jackson, 1999).   38
type of work requires careful attention to possible crowding out effects, for example shifts from 
fully taxable to tax-favored retirement saving or movement from payday lenders to other sources 
of short term credit. Other evidence can come from cross-country comparisons. 
 
  But aggregate research alone is unlikely to be sufficient. There is an urgent need for 
improved experimental data on consumer responses to and understanding of new financial 
products, and household-level field data to reveal cross-sectional variation in financial decision 
making. Most household-level field research uses surveys, such as the Federal Reserve’s Survey 
of Consumer Finances, but these surveys have severe limitations including refusals to participate 
(particularly among the wealthy), limited granularity, and inaccurate responses. In the future it 
will be important to gather accurate household-level data from a wide array of financial service 
providers. Such data will be much more useful if they can be merged into a comprehensive 
package that describes the complete financial position of households, and more useful still if they 
can be linked with survey data on households’ beliefs, stated objectives, and financial literacy.   
 TABLE 1.  Financial Holdings of U.S. Families in 2007 
Family  
characteristic 
Transaction 
accounts 
Certificates
of deposit 
Savings 
bonds Bonds  Stocks 
Pooled 
investment
funds 
Retirement 
accounts 
Cash 
value life 
insurance 
Other 
managed 
assets  Other 
Any 
financial 
asset 
   Percentage of families holding asset 
All families  92.1%  16.1%  14.9%  1.6%  17.9%  11.4%  52.6%  23.0%  5.8%  9.3%  93.9% 
By income 
percentile  
  <20  74.9  9.4  3.6  --  5.5  3.4  10.7  12.8  2.7  6.6  79.1 
  20 to <40  90.1  12.7  8.5  --  7.8  4.6  35.6  16.4  4.7  8.8  93.2 
  40 to <60  96.4  15.4  15.2  --  14.0  7.1  55.2  21.6  5.3  10.2  97.2 
  60 to <80  99.3  19.3  20.9  1.4  23.2  14.6  73.3  29.4  5.7  8.4  99.7 
  80 to <90  100.0  19.9  26.2  1.8  30.5  18.9  86.7  30.6  7.6  9.8  100.0 
  90 to <100  100.0  27.7  26.1  8.9  47.5  35.5  89.6  38.9  13.6  15.3  100.0 
                      
  Median value of holdings for families holding asset ($1000s) 
All families  $4.0  $20.0  $1.0  $80.0  $17.0  $56.0  $45.0  $8.0  $70.0  $6.0  $28.8 
By income 
percentile                    
  <20  .8  18.0  .5  --  3.8  30.0  6.5  2.5  100.0  1.5  1.7 
  20 to <40  1.6  18.0  1.0  --  10.0  30.0  12.0  5.0  86.0  3.0  7.0 
  40 to <60  2.7  17.0  .7  --  5.5  37.5  23.9  5.2  59.0  4.0  18.6 
  60 to <80  6.0  11.0  1.0  19.0  14.0  35.0  48.0  10.0  52.0  10.0  58.3 
  80 to <90  12.9  20.0  2.0  81.0  15.0  46.0  85.0  9.0  30.0  10.0  129.9 
  90 to <100  36.7  42.0  2.5  250.0  75.0  180.0  200.0  28.1  90.0  45.0  404.5 
Source: Bucks, Kennickell, Mach and Moore (2009) from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances  
TABLE 2.  Financial Liabilities of U.S. Families in 2007 
Secured by residential property 
Family  
characteristic 
Primary 
residence  Other 
Installment 
loans 
Credit card 
balances 
Lines of credit 
not secured by 
residential 
property  Other Any  debt 
   Percentage of families holding debt 
All families  48.7%  5.5%  46.9%  46.1%  1.7%  6.8%  77.0% 
By income percentile   
  <20  14.9  1.1  27.8  25.7 
* 3.9  51.7 
  20 to <40  29.5  1.9  42.3  39.4  1.8  6.8  70.2 
  40 to <60  50.5  2.6  54.0  54.9  *  6.4  83.8 
  60 to <80  69.7  6.8  59.2  62.1  2.1  8.7  90.9 
  80 to <90  80.8  8.5  57.4  55.8  *  9.6  89.6 
  90 to <100  76.4  21.9  45.0  40.6  2.1  7.0  87.6 
            
  Median value of debt for families holding debt ($1000s) 
All families  $107.0  $100.0  $13.0  $3.0  $3.8  $5.0  $67.3 
By  income  percentile            
  <20  40.0  70.0  6.5  1.0  --  3.0  9.0 
  20 to <40  51.0  42.0  9.8  1.8  1.3  4.0  18.0 
  40 to <60  88.7  68.9  12.8  2.4  --  4.0  54.5 
  60 to <80  115.0  83.0  16.3  4.0  5.1  5.3  111.3 
  80 to <90  164.0  125.0  17.3  5.5  --  5.0  182.2 
  90 to <100  201.0  147.5  18.3  7.5  17.3  7.5  235.0 
Source: Bucks, Kennickell, Mach and Moore (2009) from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
  
TABLE 3. Individual Financial Literacy 
  Health and Retirement  
Study 2004 
(Respondents largely aged 50-69 ) 
National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 2007-2008 
(Respondents aged 23-28) 
 
Financial Literacy Question  Correct  Incorrect 
Don’t know 
or refused  Correct  Incorrect 
Don’t know 
or refused 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 
2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have 
in the account if you left the money to grow: more than $102, 
exactly $102, less than $102? 
67.1 22.2  10.7  79.5  14.6  5.7 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per 
year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able 
to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the 
money in this account? 
75.2 13.4  10.4  54.0  30.7  15.1 
Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a 
single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock 
mutual fund.” 
52.3 13.2  34.6  46.8  15.8  37.3 
Source: Columns 1-3, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006); Columns 4-6, Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto (2010). 
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